This encyclopedia entry is in preparation.

Related publications (89)

Alroe H. F. (2016) Three Levels of Semiosis: Three Kinds of Kinds. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 23(2): 23–38.

Arnellos A. & Darzentas J. (2007) Exploring Creativity in the Design Process: A Systems-Semiotic Perspective. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 14(1): 37–64.

Arnellos A., Spyrou T. & Darzentas J. (2010) Towards the naturalization of agency based on an interactivist account of autonomy. New Ideas in Psychology 28: 296–311.

Asaro P. M. (2009) Information and regulation in robots, perception and consciousness: Ashby’s embodied minds. International Journal of General Systems 38(2): 111–128.

Bednarz N. & Proulx J. (2011) Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Contribution and Legacy to a Didactique des Mathématiques Research Community. Constructivist Foundations 6(2): 239–247.

Bickhard M. H. (1993) On why constructivism does not yield relativism. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 5: 275–284.

Bickhard M. H. (1997) Constructivisms and relativisms: A shopper’s guide. Science & Education 6(1–2): 29–42.

Bickhard M. H. (2011) Some consequences (and enablings) of process metaphysics. Axiomathes 21: 3–32.

Bitbol M. & Petitmengin C. (2013) A Defense of Introspection from Within. Constructivist Foundations 8(3): 269–279.

Borghi A. M. & Caruana F. (2015) Embodiment theory. In: Wright J. D. (ed.) International encyclopedia of the social & sciences. Second edition. Volume 7Elsevier, Amsterdam: 420–426.

Chryssides A., Dashtipour P., Keshet S., Righi C., Sammut G. & Sartawi M. (2009) We don’t share! The social representation approach, enactivism and the fundamental incompatibilities between the two. Culture & Psychology 15(1): 83–95.

Cifarelli V. V. & Sevim V. (2014) Examining the Role of Re-Presentation in Mathematical Problem Solving: An Application of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Conceptual Analysis. Constructivist Foundations 9(3): 360–369.

Clark A. & Toribio J. (1994) Doing without representing?. Synthese 101(3): 401–431.

Clark A. (1999) An embodied cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3(9): 345–351.

Clowes R. W. & Chrisley R. (2012) Virtualist representation. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4(2): 503–522.

Clowes R. W. & Mendonça D. (2016) Representation redux: Is there still a useful role for representation to play in the context of embodied, dynamicist and situated theories of mind?. New Ideas in Psychology 40: 26–47.

Daanen P. (2009) Conscious and non-conscious representation in social representations theory: Social representations from the phenomenological point of view. Culture & Psychology 15(3): 372–385.

De Jesus P. (2018) Thinking through enactive agency: Sense-making, bio-semiosis and the ontologies of organismic worlds. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17(5): 861–887.

Degenaar J. & Myin E. (2014) Representation-hunger reconsidered. Synthese 191(15): 3639–3648.

Domínguez Rojas A. L. (2019) Perception and hallucination: From an analytical approach to an enactive approach. Adaptive Behavior 27(1): 105–108.

Dreyfus H. (2002) Intelligence without representations – Merleau-Ponty’s critique of mental representation: The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1(4): 367–383.

Dreyfus H. L. (2002) Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty’s critique of mental representation: The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1(4): 367–383.

Díaz-Rojas D. & Soto-Andrade J. (2017) Enactive metaphors in mathematical problem solving. In: Doole T. & Gueudet G. (eds.) Proceedings of CERME10Dublin, Ireland: 3904–3911.

Elby A. (2000) What students’ learning of representations tells us about constructivism. Journal of Mathematical Behavior 19(4): 481–502.

Foerster H. von (1984) Notes on an epistemology for living things. In: Foerster H. von (ed.) Observing systems. Second editionIntersystems, Salinas CA.

Foglia L. & Grush R. (2011) The limitations of a purely enactive (non-representational) account of imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18(5–6): 35–43.

Froese T. & Stewart J. (2012) Enactive cognitive science and biology of cognition: A response to Humberto Maturana. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 19(4): 61–74.

Froese T. (2012) From adaptive behavior to human cognition: A review of Enaction. Adaptive Behavior 20: 209–221.

Froese T., Woodward A. & Ikegami T. (2013) Turing instabilities in biology, culture, and consciousness? On the enactive origins of symbolic material culture. Adaptive Behavior 21(3): 199–214.

Fultot M. F., Nie L. & Carello C. (2016) Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction. Constructivist Foundations 11(2): 298–307.

Gash H. & Murphy-Lejeune E. (2005) Children's perceptions of other cultures. In: Deegan J., Devine D. & Lodge A. (eds.) Primary voices: Equality diversity and childhood in irish primary schoolsInstitute of Public Administration, Dublin Ireland: 205–221.

Gash H., Romeu N. I. & Pina J. A. L. (2004) Spanish and Irish images of special needs: Perceptions of inclusion. In: Walsh P. N. & Gash H. (eds.) Lives and Times: Practice Policy and People with disabilityWordwell, Dublin: 180–223.

Gärtner K. & Clowes R. W. (2017) Enactivism, radical enactivism and predictive processing: What is radical in cognitive science? Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 18(1): 54–83.

Gładziejewski P. (2016) Predictive coding and representationalism. Synthese 193(2): 559–582.

Harvey I. (2020) Neurath’s boat and the Sally-Anne test: Life, cognition, matter and stuff. Adaptive Behavior 28: 10–1177.

Harvey M. I. (2015) Content in languaging: Why radical enactivism is incompatible with representational theories of language. Language Sciences 48: 90–129.

Havelange V., Lenay C. & Stewart J. (2003) Les représentations: mémoire externe et objets techniques. Intellectica 35: 115–129.

Hutto D. D. & Myin E. (2018) Much ado about nothing? Why going non-semantic is not merely semantics. Philosophical Explorations 21(2): 187–203.

Hutto D. D. (2009) Mental representation and consciousness. In: Banks W. P. (ed.) Encyclopedia of consciousness. Volume 2Academic Press, New York: 19–32.

Hutto D. D. (2013) Exorcising action oriented representations: Ridding cognitive science of its Nazgûl. Adaptive Behavior 21(3): 142–150.

Hutto D. D. (2017) REC: Revolution effected by clarification. Topoi 36(3): 377–391.

Hutto D., Kirchhoff M. & Myin E. (2014) Extensive enactivism: Why keep it all in?. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8: 706.

Johnson M. & Rohrer T. (2007) We are living creatures: Embodiment, American pragmatism, and the cognitive organism. In: Zlatev J., Ziemke T., Frank R. & Dirven R. (eds.) Body, language, and mind. Volume 1Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin: 17–54.

Jonassen D. H. (1991) Objectivism versus constructivism: Do we need a new philosophical paradigm?. Journal of Educational Research 39(3): 5–14.

Kastrup B. (2017) There is an “unconscious,” but it may well be conscious. Europe’s Journal of Psychology 13(3): 559–572.

Kiefer A. & Hohwy J. (2018) Content and misrepresentation in hierarchical generative models. Synthese 195(6): 2387–2415.

Kirchhoff M. D. & Robertson I. (2018) Enactivism and predictive processing: A non-representational view. Philosophical Explorations 21(2): 264–281.

Kiverstein J. D. & Rietveld E. (2018) Reconceiving representation-hungry cognition: An ecological-enactive proposal. Adaptive Behavior 26(4): 147–163.

Kravchenko A. (2007) Essential properties of language or why language is not a code. Language Sciences 29: 650–671.

Matthen M. (2014) Debunking enactivism: A critical notice of Hutto and Myin’s Radicalizing Enactivism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4(1): 118–128.

Moutoussis M., Fearon P., El-Deredy W., Dolan R. J. & Friston K. J. (2014) Bayesian inferences about the self (and others): A review. Consciousness and Cognition 25: 67–76.

Nadin M. (2011) Information and Semiotic Processes The Semiotics of Computation. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 18(1–2): 153–175.

Nielsen K. S. (2010) Representation and dynamics. Philosophical Psychology 23: 759–773.

Palacios A. G., Escobar M.-J. & Céspedes E. (2017) Missing Colors: The Enactivist Approach to Perception. Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 117–125.

Papineau D. (2016) Against representationalism (about conscious sensory experience). International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24(3): 324–347.

Parthemore J. (2013) The unified conceptual space theory: An enactive theory of concepts. Adaptive Behavior 21(3): 168–177.

Peeters A. & Segundo-Ortin M. (2019) Misplacing memories? An enactive approach to the virtual memory palace. Consciousness and Cognition 76: 102834.

Peschl M. F. (1992) Construction, representation, and the embodiment of knowledge, meaning, and symbols in neural structures: Towards an alternative understanding of knowledge representation and philosophy of science. Connection Science 4(3–4): 327–338.

Peschl M. F. (1997) The representational relation between environmental structures and neural systems: Autonomy and environmental dependency in neural knowledge representation. Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology. and Life Sciences 1(2): 99–121.

Peschl M. F. (2001) Constructivism, cognition, and science: An investigation of its links and possible shortcomings. Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 125–161.

Peschl M. P. & Stary C. (1998) The role of cognitive modeling for user interface design representations: An epistemological analysis of knowledge engineering in the context of human-computer interaction. Minds and Machines 8(2): 203–236.

Raleigh T. (2018) Tolerant enactivist cognitive science. Philosophical Explorations 21(2): 226–244.

Ramsey W. M. (2017) Must cognition be representational?. Synthese 194(11): 4197–4214.

Ramstead M. J. D., Kirchhoff M. D. & Friston K. J. (2019) A tale of two densities: Active inference is enactive inference. Adaptive Behavior online first.

Riegler A. (2002) When is a cognitive system embodied?. Cognitive Systems Research 3(3): 339–348.

Rowlands M. (2007) Understanding the “active” in “enactive”. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6(4): 427–443.

Rowlands M. J. (2007) Understanding the “active” in “enactive”. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6(4): 427–443.

Rupert R. D. (2018) Representation and mental representation. Philosophical Explorations 21(2): 204–225.

Sebastian M. A. (2018) Embodied appearance properties and subjectivity. Adaptive Behavior 26(5): 199–210.

Sprevak M. (2010) Computation, individuation, and the received view of representation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41: 260–270.

Sridharan V. (2015) Beyond consensual domains: Enactivism, social representations and third-order unities. Culture & Psychology 21(2): 259–275.

Steiner P. (2014) Enacting anti-representationalism: The scope and the limits of enactive critiques of representationalism. Avant 2014(2): 43–86.

Steiner P. (2021) Steering a middle course between intentionality and representation: Some remarks about John Stewart’s enactive stance. Adaptive Behavior: online first.

Travis C. (2004) The silence of the senses. Mind 113(449): 57–94.

Vallee-Tourangeau G. & Vallee-Tourangeau F. (2014) The Spatio-temporal Dynamics of Systemic Thinking. Cybernetics & Human Knowing 21(1–2): 113–127.

Van Dijk L., Withagen R. & Bongers R. M. (2015) Information without content: A Gibsonian reply to enactivist’s worries. Cognition 134: 210–214.

Varela F. J. (1986) Experimental epistemology: Background and future. Cahiers du Centre de Recherche, Epistemologie et Autonomie (CREA) 9: 107–121.

Verheggen T. & Baerveldt C. (2007) We don’t share! The social representation approach, enactivism and the ground for an intrinsically social Psychology. Culture & Psychology 13(1): 5–27.

Verheggen T. & Baerveldt C. (2012) Mixed up perspectives: Reply to Chryssides et al. and Daanen and their critique of enactive cultural psychology. Culture & Psychology 18(2): 272–284.

Villalobos M. & Dewhurst J. (2017) Why post-cognitivism does not (necessarily) entail anti-computationalism. Adaptive Behavior 25(3): 117–128.

Vörös S., Froese T. & Riegler A. (2016) Epistemological Odyssey: Introduction to Special Issue on the Diversity of Enactivism and Neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11(2): 189–204.

Walmsley L. D. (2017) Please explain: Radical enactivism and its explanatory debt. In: Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science SocietyCognitive Science Society, Austin TX: 1313–1318.

Wheeler M. (2017) The revolution will not be optimised: Radical enactivism, extended functionalism and the extensive mind. Topoi 36(3): 457–472.

Williams D. (2018) Predictive minds and small-scale models: Kenneth Craik’s contribution to cognitive science. Philosophical Explorations 21(2): 245–263.

Xu F., Dewar K. & Perfors A. (2009) Induction, overhypotheses, and the shape bias: Some arguments and evidence for rational constructivism. In: Hood B. M. & Santos L. (eds.) The origins of object knowledgeOxford University Press, New York NY: 263–284.

Zahidi K. (2014) Non-representational cognitive science and realism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13(3): 461–475.

Zeedyk M. S. (2006) From intersubjectivity to subjectivity: The transformative roles of emotional intimacy and imitation. Infant and Child Development 15: 321–344.

Ziemke T. (2016) The body of knowledge: On the role of the living body in grounding embodied cognition. Biosystems 148: 4–11.

van Dijk L. (2016) Laying down a path in talking. Philosophical Psychology 29(7): 993–1003.